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PUNTING ON LOGIC:  THE ROBERTS COURT TO 
SACK SMALL BUSINESS ONCE AGAIN IN 
AMERICAN NEEDLE V. NFL 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) granted cer-
tiorari to American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League on June 29, 
2009,1 it created a ripple effect throughout the major media organizations.  
A Sports Illustrated headline read, “Why American Needle-NFL is most 
important case in sports history.”2  The New York Times warned readers, 
“Antitrust Case Has Implications Far Beyond N.F.L.”3  ESPN’s home web 
page declared, “Antitrust case could be Armageddon.”4  When athletic is-
sues arise, traditional sports outlets are typically the only ones to report the 
news.  This time, however, articles discussing the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion to grant certiorari to American Needle surfaced all over the national 
media, including The Wall Street Journal,5 The Washington Post,6 and non-
sports related Internet blogs.7 
Why has so much ink been spilled over an antitrust lawsuit?  The an-
swer to this question lies in the repercussions that will be felt by sports 
                                                           
1.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 
129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari Granted]. 
2.  Michael McCann, Why American Needle-NFL is Most Important Case in Sports His-
tory, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM, Jan. 12, 2010, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/michael_mccann/01/12/americanneedlev.nfl/index.html. 
3.  Ken Belson & Alan Schwarz, Antitrust Case Has Implications Far Beyond N.F.L., 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at B13. 
4.  Lester Munson, Antitrust Case Could Be Armageddon, ESPN.COM, July 17, 2009, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?columnist=munson_lester&id=4336261. 
5.  Posting of Ashby Jones to Wall St. J. L. Blog, Threading ‘American Needle’:  Could It 
Destroy Free Agency in the NFL?, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/01/12/threading-american-
needle-could-it-destroy-free-agency-in-the-nfl/ (Jan. 12, 2010, 4:12 EST) [hereinafter Threading 
American Needle]. 
6.  Drew Brees, The NFL Shouldn’t Call All the Plays, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2010, at B2. 
7.  See Posting of Marc Edelman to Above the Law, Sports and the Law:  SCOTUS Grants 
Cert in American Needle v. NFL, 
http://abovethelaw.com/2009/06/sports_and_the_law_scotus_gran.php (June 30, 2009, 10:00 
EST); Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, Pro Sports and Antitrust:  Argument Preview, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/pro-sports-and-antitrust-argument-preview/ (Jan. 12, 2010, 
7:32 EST); Posting of Gabriel A. Feldman to The Huffington Post, American Needle and the 
NFL’s Single Entity Argument, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gabriel-a-feldman/american-
needle-and-the-n_b_409532.html (Jan. 2, 2010, 11:09 EST) [hereinafter The Huffington Post]. 
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fans, professional athletes, coaches, and small businesses like American 
Needle, a hat manufacturer in Illinois.8  Simply put, a ruling in favor of the 
National Football League (NFL) in American Needle—that the league is a 
single entity rather than thirty-two separate teams—would mean that the 
league is completely immune from antitrust laws.9  If the Supreme Court 
grants the NFL total immunity from antitrust laws, it would also apply to 
the National Hockey League, the National Basketball Association (NBA), 
and the Bowl Championship Series.10  The immunity would completely 
transform the way professional sports leagues (sports leagues) conduct their 
business.11   
A decision for the NFL “has the potential to adversely affect fans 
through higher prices for merchandise, concessions, parking at stadiums 
and even in fees to join fantasy football leagues.”12  The largest implica-
tions, however, would be felt on the labor front.13  A victory for the NFL 
could spark “a significant shift in the leverage sports leagues have over 
players unions . . . giv[ing] the [sports] league[s] latitude to implement a 
salary structure of its choosing without fear of antitrust scrutiny and penal-
ties for collusion.”14  Without the ability to challenge sports leagues on an-
titrust grounds,15 the players’ only option would be to go on strike.16   
If the Supreme Court sides with the NFL, many small businesses will 
be completely shut out from doing business with the league and “will have 
less recourse to sue on antitrust grounds.”17  Without price competition 
from small businesses, the NFL will be able to engage in exclusive com-
mercial deals with the highest bidder, such as Nike or Reebok,18 ultimately 
forcing small businesses out of the market and driving up prices for fans.  
With so much at stake in American Needle—on and off the playing field—
how the Supreme Court rules will reshape the foundation of sports law, re-
sulting in a significant impact on sports fans, leagues, players, and small 
businesses.19 
                                                           
8.  Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13. 
9.  Munson, supra note 4. 
10.  Id. 
11.  McCann, supra note 2.  
12.  Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13. 
13.  Threading American Needle, supra note 5. 
14.  Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13. 
15.  Brees, supra note 6, at B2.   
16.  See Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13. 
17.  Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13; see also Ken Belson, The N.F.L. Is Squeez-
ing Discounters Over Apparel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, at B11. 
18.  See The Huffington Post, supra note 7; Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13. 
19.  Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13. 
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This Note examines the role that the Supreme Court’s recent pro-
business antitrust jurisprudence under the guidance of Chief Justice John 
Roberts will play in determining whether sports leagues can constitute a 
single entity in American Needle.  Part II provides a general overview of 
American Needle and shows how the case made its way to the Supreme 
Court.  Part III analyzes Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.20 
and the creation of the single entity doctrine.  Part IV discusses the current 
split in the federal circuit courts as to the correct application of Copperweld 
to sports leagues and urges the Supreme Court to adopt the majority ap-
proach in American Needle.  Part V analyzes the current pro-business trend 
of the Supreme Court and the role that the justices’ political affiliations 
have played in its antitrust jurisprudence under Chief Justice Roberts.  Part 
VI of this Note will examine the effect that the appointment of Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court by President Barack Obama may 
have on the Supreme Court’s current pro-business antitrust jurisprudence.  
Finally, this Note will conclude that despite the fact most commentators 
and the majority of circuit courts have rejected single entity treatment for 
sports leagues, the Supreme Court’s recent antitrust jurisprudence strongly 
points towards a ruling in favor of the NFL in American Needle. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Currently, a direct conflict exists in the federal circuit courts of appeal 
on the issue of whether a sports league should be considered a single entity 
for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act).21  In 
1984, the Supreme Court held in Copperweld that a parent company and its 
wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring with each other for 
purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (Section 1), stating that they act 
as a single entity and therefore should be completely immune from antitrust 
liability under Section 1.22  However, “what the Supreme Court has never 
decided is [whether] Copperweld applies to more complex entities and ar-
rangements that involve a high degree of corporate and economic integra-
tion,” such as sports leagues.23  The majority of federal circuit courts have 
used Copperweld to hold that sports leagues should not be given single en-
                                                           
20.  Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
21.  James A. Keyte, American Needle Reinvigorates the Single-Entity Debate, 
ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 48 (stating that American Needle “creates a clear split between the 
Seventh Circuit and several other circuits, including the First, Second, and Ninth, all of which 
have declined to accord single-entity status to sports leagues”). 
22.  Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). 
23.  Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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tity status under Section 1.24  However, the Seventh Circuit in American 
Needle, as well as a minority of federal circuit courts, has used Copperweld 
to hold that sports leagues should be treated as a single entity for Section 1 
purposes.25  Because the Supreme Court did not set clear guidelines in 
Copperweld as to when single entity status should be applied,26 the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to American Needle27 to resolve the current 
federal circuit court split and to clarify whether a professional sports league 
should be considered a single entity for purposes of Section 1.28  
American Needle Inc. is a headwear manufacturer that features the 
logos and trademarks of professional sports teams on baseball style hats.29  
The NFL is an association, consisting of thirty-two teams, that produces a 
season of highly integrated games that culminates in two member teams 
playing for the Super Bowl championship.30  For over twenty years, 
American Needle was one of many vendors that held a license from the 
NFL authorizing it to use each NFL team’s intellectual property to create 
headwear bearing the team logos.31  However, in 2000, the NFL decided to 
solicit bids from individual vendors for an exclusive license to manufacture 
                                                           
24.  See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1478c, at 
327 (2d ed. 2003) (stating that “the courts have mainly rejected” single entity status for profes-
sional sports leagues); Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient Joint Ven-
tures:  Why Sports Leagues Should Look More Like McDonald's and Less Like the United Na-
tions, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 213, 238 (2006) (“[C]ourts have overwhelmingly rejected 
efforts by club-run leagues to be treated as single entities.”); Marc Edelman, Why the “Single En-
tity” Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs:  A Primer on Property-Rights Theory in Profes-
sional Sports, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 891, 893 n.11 (2008) (“Many 
courts have rejected the single-entity defense in the scope of premier American sports leagues.”). 
25.  Brief for the NFL Respondents at 6, petition for cert. filed, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l 
Football League, (U.S. Jan. 21, 2009) (No. 08-661), 2009 WL 164245 [hereinafter Brief for the 
NFL] (“The Seventh Circuit has now twice held that a professional sports league can constitute a 
single entity even if its member teams are separately owned.”); see also Brief of Amici Curiae 
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n and NBA Properties in support of the NFL Respondents’ Response at 4, 
petition for cert. filed, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, (U.S. Jan. 21, 2009) (No. 08-
661), 2009 WL 164243 [hereinafter Brief for the NBA] (“The Fourth and Fifth Circuits appear to 
agree with the Seventh, having applied Copperweld to find the activities of other sports leagues to 
fall outside the scope of Section 1.”). 
26.  James T. McKeown, 2008 Antitrust Developments in Professional Sports:  To The 
Single Entity And Beyond, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 363, 367 (2009) (stating that the “Supreme 
Court did not set clear parameters for what constitutes a single economic entity, and antitrust de-
fendants have cited Copperweld to argue that other forms of relationship fall within the single 
entity classification.”). 
27.  Petition for Certiorari Granted, supra note 1. 
28.  See McCann, supra note 2. 
29.  See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2008). 
30.  Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 1. 
31.  Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 737–38. 
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headwear.32  The following year, the NFL refused to renew its headwear 
license with American Needle, and instead granted an exclusive headwear 
license to Reebok.33  As a result, American Needle brought an antitrust 
lawsuit against the NFL, NFL teams, NFL Properties, and Reebok, claim-
ing that the exclusive headwear agreement with Reebok violated Section 
1.34  Since each NFL team owns its respective logos and trademarks, 
American Needle argued that the teams’ collective agreement to grant the 
exclusive license to Reebok was a conspiracy to restrict vendors, such as 
American Needle, from acquiring licenses to the NFL team’s intellectual 
property.35  The NFL responded by arguing that when licensing a member 
team’s intellectual property, the NFL was acting as a single entity pursuant 
to Copperweld and was thus immune from Section 1 liability.36  Applying 
the Copperweld doctrine—that “single entities cannot restrain trade in vio-
lation of the Sherman Antitrust Act”—the district court granted the NFL’s 
motion for summary judgment.37  The district court reasoned that, “by 
promoting NFL football through collective licensing . . . the NFL teams 
‘act[ ] as an economic unit’ in such a manner that ‘they should be deemed . 
. . a single entity.’”38 
Following the judgment, American Needle appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit claiming that the district court erred in 
treating the NFL as a single entity for purposes of Section 1.39  Relying on 
its earlier decision in Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. 
National Basketball Association,40 the Seventh Circuit started its analysis 
by embracing the “possibility that a professional sports league could be 
considered a single entity under Copperweld.”41  The court of appeals re-
jected American Needle’s argument that the exclusive license with Reebok 
deprived the market of independent sources of economic power and instead 
reasoned “that the NFL teams share[d] a vital economic interest in collec-
tively promoting NFL football. . . .  [To] compete[] with other forms of en-
tertainment.”42  The Seventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s 
                                                           
32.  Id. at 738. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. at 738–39. 
37.  Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 739. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. at 741. 
40.  Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 
1996). 
41.  Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 742. 
42.  Id. at 743. 
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decision, declaring that “the NFL teams are best described as a single 
source of economic power when promoting NFL football through licensing 
the teams’ intellectual property . . . .”43  
Although the Seventh Circuit held that the NFL could be considered a 
single entity when licensing its intellectual property,44 the question still re-
mained as to whether the NFL should be treated as a single entity with re-
spect to other core ventures.45  The American Needle holding, although in 
favor of the NFL, actually added to the confusion regarding Copperweld’s 
application to sports leagues by creating a split between the Seventh Circuit 
and other circuits such as the First and Ninth, which had denied single en-
tity treatment to sports leagues.46  In an effort to clarify the proper applica-
tion of Copperweld to sports leagues, the NFL took the unusual step of 
supporting American Needle’s request for certiorari to the Supreme 
Court.47  This was done to secure a uniform rule recognizing all sports 
leagues as single entities.48  Presumably because the federal circuits are in 
direct conflict regarding Copperweld’s application to sports leagues, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari against the advice of the United States 
Solicitor General.49  By granting the NFL’s request for certiorari,50 the Su-
preme Court is likely to establish a rule that clarifies how sports leagues are 
to be treated under Copperweld.51  
III.  COPPERWELD AND THE SINGLE ENTITY DOCTRINE 
 In 1984, the Supreme Court established the single entity doctrine in 
                                                           
43.  Id. at 744. 
44.  Id. (“[T]he NFL teams are best described as a single source of economic power when 
promoting NFL football through licensing the teams’ intellectual property . . . .”). 
45.  See Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 4 (stating that “[t]he NFL Respondents are 
taking the unusual step of supporting certiorari in an effort to secure a uniform rule that (i) recog-
nizes the singe-entity nature of highly integrated joint ventures . . . .”). 
46.  Keyte, supra note 21, at 48 (stating that American Needle “creates a clear split be-
tween the Seventh Circuit and several other circuits, including the First, Second, and Ninth, all of 
which have declined to accord single-entity status to sports leagues . . . .”). 
47.  Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 4 (stating that “[t]he NFL Respondents are taking 
the unusual step of supporting certiorari in an effort to secure a uniform rule that (i) recognizes 
the singe-entity nature of highly integrated joint ventures . . . .”). 
48.  Id. 
49.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, petition for cert. filed, Am. Needle, 
Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, (U.S. May 28, 2009) (No. 08-661), 2009 WL 1497823 [hereinafter 
Brief for the U.S.] (“In the view of the United States, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be 
denied.”). 
50.  Petition for Certiorari Granted, supra note 1. 
51.  See McCann, supra note 2. 
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Copperweld.52  There, the plaintiff alleged that a tubing company and its 
parent corporation had conspired in violation of Section 1.53  In the lower 
federal courts, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision to hold the parent corporation and its wholly owned 
subsidiary liable under Section 1.54  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to determine whether a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary were capa-
ble of conspiring for purposes of Section 1.55  The Supreme Court started 
its analysis by looking at the language and history of the Sherman Act it-
self.56  Section 1 states: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every 
person who shall make any contract or engage in any combina-
tion or conspiracy hereby declared illegal shall be deemed guilty 
of a felony . . . .57 
After reviewing the plain language of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court 
found that by enacting the statute, Congress made a conscious decision to 
accord different treatment under the Sherman Act to the type of conduct in 
this case.58  The Supreme Court noted that, “[u]nless we second-guess the 
judgment of Congress . . . we can only conclude that the coordinated be-
havior of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary falls outside the reach” 
of Section 1.59  From this, the Supreme Court concluded that a parent com-
pany and its wholly owned subsidiary were incapable of conspiring with 
each other in violation of the Sherman Act.60  The Supreme Court held that 
for purposes of Section 1, a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are to 
be considered a single entity, and thus immune from Section 1 liability.61   
The Supreme Court came to its holding by reasoning that there was a 
“complete unity of interest” between a parent and its wholly owned sub-
                                                           
52.  Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
53.  Id. at 755–58. 
54.  Id. at 758. 
55.  Id. at 767. 
56.  Id.  
57.  Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
58.  Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 775 (“[T]he Act’s plain language leaves no doubt that Con-
gress made a purposeful choice to accord different treatment to unilateral and concerted con-
duct.”). 
59.  Id. at 776. 
60.  Id. at 777 (holding “that Copperweld and its wholly owned subsidiary Regal are inca-
pable of conspiring with each other for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”). 
61.  Id. at 771. 
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sidiary.62  Because of this “complete unity of interest,” the Supreme Court 
reasoned that there could be no combination or agreement of the type that 
joined parties who had previously maintained different interests.63  Since it 
was this type of agreement that Section 1 sought to prevent, the Supreme 
Court held that there was no justification for liability against a parent com-
pany and its wholly owned subsidiary under Section 1.64  
A.  Copperweld Creates Uncertainty For Antitrust Defendants 
While Copperweld is important for establishing a clear rule that a 
parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary are to be considered a 
single entity for purposes of Section 1,65 the decision has created significant 
uncertainty in other contexts.66  In Copperweld, the Supreme Court failed 
to set clear guidelines for what other types of relationships may be afforded 
single entity status, causing defendants in antitrust litigation to argue for 
application of the Copperweld single entity doctrine to other forms of busi-
ness relationships.67  As the First Circuit noted in Fraser v. Major League 
Soccer, L.L.C., “what the Supreme Court has never decided is how far 
Copperweld applies to more complex entities and arrangements that in-
volve a high degree of corporate and economic integration but less than 
that existing in Copperweld itself.”68  As a result of the confusion about 
what other types of business relationships may receive single entity treat-
ment, some federal circuit courts have applied single entity status to certain 
types of business relationships while other federal circuit courts have de-
nied single entity treatment to the very same types of business relation-
                                                           
62.  Id.  
63.  Id. (stating that “[i]f a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary do ‘agree’ to a course of 
action, there is no sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served differed inter-
ests . . . .”). 
64.  Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771 (reasoning that because a parent and its wholly owned 
subsidiary could not produce a “sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served 
different interests . . . there is no justification for § 1 scrutiny.”).  
65.  Id. at 776. 
66.  See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[W]hat 
the Supreme Court has never decided is how far Copperweld applies to more complex entities 
and arrangements that involve a high degree of corporate and economic integration but less than 
that existing in Copperweld itself.”); see also McKeown, supra note 26, at 367 (stating that the 
“Supreme Court did not set clear parameters for what constitutes a single economic entity, and 
antitrust defendants have cited Copperweld to argue that other forms of relationship fall within 
the single entity classification.”). 
67.  McKeown, supra note 26, at 367 (stating that the “Supreme Court did not set clear pa-
rameters for what constitutes a single economic entity, and antitrust defendants have cited Cop-
perweld to argue that other forms of relationship fall within the single entity classification.”). 
68.  Fraser, 284 F.3d at 56.  
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ships.69  This is exactly what has happened in the application of the single 
entity doctrine to sports leagues in the federal circuit courts.70  As ex-
plained below, the federal circuit courts are currently in direct conflict on 
the issue of whether single entity status, and the immunity to the Sherman 
Act it affords under Copperweld, extends to sports leagues.71 
IV.  COMPARE AND CONTRAST:  THE APPROACHES TO ANALYZING 
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES AS A SINGLE ENTITY 
A.  The Majority Approach 
The majority of federal circuit courts have rejected the notion that 
sports leagues are a single entity under Copperweld.72  Consequently, they 
have held that the individual teams are separate entities capable of conspir-
ing with one another for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.73  The 
Ninth Circuit articulated the reasoning behind this position in the seminal 
case Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football 
League.74  In this 1984 case, the NFL argued that the structure of its league 
is similar to that of a joint venture and thus should be afforded single entity 
                                                           
69.  Compare Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994) (“We 
do not agree that Copperweld, which found a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary to be a 
single enterprise for purposes of §1, applies to the facts of this case or affects the prior precedent 
concerning the NFL.”) (citation omitted), with Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball 
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1996) (“We see no reason why a sports league cannot be treated 
as a single firm . . . .”). 
70.  Compare Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099 (“We do not agree that Copperweld, which found 
a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary to be a single enterprise for purposes of §1, applies 
to the facts of this case or affects the prior precedent concerning the NFL.”) (citation omitted), 
with Chi. Prof’l Sports, 95 F.3d at 598 (“We see no reason why a sports league cannot be treated 
as a single firm . . . .”). 
71.  Keyte, supra note 21, at 48 (stating that American Needle “creates a clear split be-
tween the Seventh Circuit and several other circuits, including the First, Second, and Ninth, all of 
which have declined to accord single-entity status to sports leagues . . . .”). 
72.  See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 327 (stating that “the courts have 
mainly rejected” single entity status for professional sports leagues); Ross & Szymanski, supra 
note 24, at 238 (“[C]ourts have overwhelmingly rejected efforts by club-run leagues to be treated 
as single entities.”); Edelman, supra note 24, at 893 n.11 (“Many courts have rejected the single-
entity defense in the scope of premier American sports leagues.”). 
73.  See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 
(9th Cir. 1984) (stating that “[t]hese attributes operate to make each team an entity in large part 
distinct from the NFL.”); Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099 (“We do not agree that Copperweld, which 
found a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary to be a single enterprise for purposes of §1, 
applies to the facts of this case or affects the prior precedent concerning the NFL.”) (citation 
omitted). 
74.  L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1381. 
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status under Copperweld.75  In rejecting the NFL’s argument, the Ninth 
Circuit found that each team acts as an individual entity, wholly distinct 
from the NFL itself.76  In analyzing the structure of the league, the Ninth 
Circuit first noted that each team was independently owned, and that each 
team’s profits and losses were not shared, which is a characteristic that is 
not common in the types of joint ventures and partnerships that are usually 
given single entity status.77  Second, because profits and losses are not 
shared, each NFL team is forced to compete with one another to secure 
media coverage, fan support, sponsorship deals, television revenues, and 
talented players and coaches.78   
The First Circuit, in Sullivan v. National Football League, stated that 
it was this exact type of competition between the NFL teams that removed 
the league from consideration for single entity status under Copperweld.79  
The First Circuit stated that this type of competition off of the field “tends 
to show that the teams pursue diverse interests and thus are not a single en-
terprise under §1.”80  Other circuits have denied single entity status to other 
sports leagues as well, such as Major League Soccer,81 the Ontario Hockey 
League,82 and a professional tennis league.83  In reviewing these holdings, 
                                                           
75.  Id. at 1387 (stating that “[t]he NFL contends the league structure is in essence a single 
entity, akin to a partnership or joint venture, precluding application of Sherman Act section 1 
which prevents only contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade.”). 
76.  Id. at 1390 (stating that “[t]hese attributes operate to make each team an entity in large 
part distinct from the NFL.”). 
77.  Id. at 1389–90 (reasoning that “although a large portion of League revenue, approxi-
mately 90%, is divided equally among the teams, profits and losses are not shared, a feature 
common to partnerships or other ‘single entities.’”). 
78.  Id. at 1390 (“In addition to being independent business entities, the NFL clubs do 
compete with one another off the field as well as on to acquire players, coaches, and management 
personnel. . . . [T]here is also competition for fan support, local television and local radio reve-
nues, and media space.”). 
79.  Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994) (“We do not 
agree that Copperweld, which found a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary to be a single 
enterprise for purposes of §1, applies to the facts of this case or affects the prior precedent con-
cerning the NFL.”) (citation omitted). 
80.  Id. 
81.  See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 48 (1st Cir. 2002) (denying 
single entity status to Major League Soccer). 
82.  See Nat’l Hockey League Players Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 
462, 470 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that “[j]ust as the National Football League could not accu-
rately be characterized as a ‘single economic entity,’ neither could the OHL, which exists only as 
constituted by its twenty member teams”). 
83.  See Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men’s Int’l Prof’l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 71 (2nd 
Cir. 1988) (holding that “[c]ourts have consistently held that, since joint ventures—including 
sports leagues and other such associations—consist of multiple entities, they can violate §1 of the 
Sherman Act”).   
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the decision to reject single entity status for sports leagues seems to be 
based on the distinct diversity in interests of each individual team, from in-
dependent ownership to competition for players, fans, and media cover-
age.84  These diverse interests are inconsistent with the “complete unity of 
interest” element that Copperweld requires for single entity treatment.85 
B.  The Minority Approach 
The Seventh Circuit has twice held that sports leagues can be consid-
ered a single entity under Copperweld, even though the majority of federal 
circuit courts have held that sports leagues should not be considered a sin-
gle entity for purposes of Section 1.86  Other circuits, including the Fourth 
and Fifth, have reached similar conclusions.87  These courts have noted that 
Copperweld does not set a clear standard for how sports leagues should be 
viewed in terms of the single entity doctrine,88 and believe that the question 
should be answered “one league at a time–and perhaps one facet of a 
league at a time.”89   
The Seventh Circuit articulated this position in the seminal case Chi. 
Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship, decided in 1996.90  The court first focused on the 
fact that each team in the NBA, although independently and separately 
owned, produces a single product that could not be produced without the 
cooperation of all of the other teams.91  As the court famously noted, “a 
league with one team would be like one hand clapping.”92  Under its “crea-
tion of a single product” viewpoint, the Seventh Circuit analogized the 
                                                           
84.  See Keyte, supra note 21, at 49 (stating that in sports league cases it is not difficult “to 
highlight facts about league structure, governance, and the characteristics of individual teams to 
argue that not every team has a complete unity of interest with every other team.”). 
85.  See id. 
86.  Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 6 (“The Seventh Circuit has now twice held that a 
professional sports league can constitute a single entity even if its member teams are separately 
owned.”).  
87.  Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 4 (“The Fourth and Fifth Circuits appear to agree 
with the Seventh, having applied Copperweld to find the activities of other sports leagues to fall 
outside the scope of Section 1.”).  
88.  Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 
1996) (“These cases do not yield a clear principle about the proper characterization of sports 
leagues–and we do not think that Copperweld imposes one ‘right’ characterization.”). 
89.  Id. (stating a need to ask “Copperweld’s functional question one league at a time—and 
perhaps one facet of a league at a time”). 
90.  Id. at 593. 
91.  Id. at 598–99 (stating that the NBA “produces a single product; cooperation is essen-
tial”). 
92.  Id. 
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NBA to an automaker.93  The Seventh Circuit stated that the NBA is “one 
product from a single source even though the Chicago Bulls and Seattle 
Supersonics are highly distinguishable, just as General Motors is a single 
firm even though a Corvette differs from a Chevrolet.”94   
In holding that the NBA could be considered a single entity under 
Copperweld, the Seventh Circuit also relied on language from the Supreme 
Court decision of Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., which stated that “the clubs 
that make up a professional sports league are not completely independent 
economic competitors, as they depend upon a degree of cooperation for 
economic survival” and that “circumstance[s] make[ ] the league more like 
a single bargaining employer.”95  Other circuits have used this same reason-
ing in applying single entity status to soccer organizations and professional 
golf associations.96  In holding that sports leagues can be considered a sin-
gle entity under Section 1, these courts seem to focus their attention on the 
necessity required of each team to work together to create the game itself, 
which is in line with the complete unity of interest element required under 
Copperweld.97  
C.  Why the Majority Approach is Better 
Most commentators agree that the majority of federal circuit courts 
have engaged in the proper approach of analysis in holding that sports 
leagues should not be considered a single entity for purposes of Section 1.98  
Such commentators agree with the First99 and Ninth Circuits100 that sports 
leagues fail to meet the Copperweld requirement of “complete unity of in-
terest” that is necessary to be afforded single entity treatment.101  In regards 
                                                           
93.  Id. at 599. 
94.  Chi. Prof’l Sports, 95 F.3d at 599. 
95.  Id. (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 248–49 (1996)). 
96.  Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 4 (“The Fourth and Fifth Circuits appear to agree 
with the Seventh, having applied Copperweld to find the activities of other sports leagues to fall 
outside the scope of Section 1.”). 
97.  See Chi. Prof’l Sports, 95 F.3d at 598-99. 
98.  See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 327 (stating that “the courts have 
mainly rejected” single entity status for professional sports leagues); Ross & Szymanski, supra 
note 24, at 238 (“[C]ourts have overwhelmingly rejected efforts by club-run leagues to be treated 
as single entities.”); Edelman, supra note 24, at 893 n.11 (“Many courts have rejected the single-
entity defense in the scope of premier American sports leagues.”). 
99.  See Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994). 
100.  See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389–
90 (9th Cir. 1984). 
101.  See Edelman, supra note 24, at 894 (arguing that “sports leagues lack sufficient unity 
of interest for any court to classify them as ‘single entities’”). 
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to a lack of “complete unity of interest,” many commentators focus on 
league structure and governance, and the diverse interests of individual 
teams.102  Consistent with the holdings of the First and Ninth Circuits,103 
commentators specifically point to the competition among each league’s 
member teams in areas such as ticket sales, player acquisition, corporate 
sponsorships, and television, radio and merchandising revenues to support 
their position.104  
1.  The Majority Approach is Consistent with the Original Meaning Behind 
the Single Entity Doctrine 
The Supreme Court should use the opportunity presented in American 
Needle to firmly establish that sports leagues are not to be considered a sin-
gle entity for purposes of Section 1.  The Supreme Court should follow the 
reasoning used by the majority of federal circuit courts by rejecting the 
NFL’s claim for single entity treatment because the majority approach’s 
reasoning is consistent with the original meaning behind single entity status 
established in Copperweld.105  To receive single entity status, Copperweld 
requires a “complete unity of interest.”106  According to the Supreme Court 
in Copperweld, the “complete unity of interest” between a parent company 
and its wholly owned subsidiary was the exact type of coordinated behavior 
Congress believed fell outside the Sherman Act’s scope.107  The Supreme 
Court explained that the “complete unity of interest” between a parent 
company and its wholly owned subsidiary could not form the type of 
agreement covered by Section 1.108  The Supreme Court stated that, “if a 
                                                           
102.  See Keyte, supra note 21, at 49 (stating that in sports league cases it is not difficult 
“to highlight facts about league structure, governance, and the characteristics of individual teams 
to argue that not every team has a complete unity of interest with every other team.”). 
103.  See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099 (“We do not agree that Copperweld, which found a 
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary to be a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 . . . ap-
plies to the facts of this case or affects the prior precedent concerning the NFL.”) (citation omit-
ted); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390 (stating that “[t]hese attributes operate to make each 
team an entity in large part distinct from the NFL.”). 
104.  See Edelman, supra note 24, at 925 (“[T]here is little doubt that clubs in these 
leagues lack complete unity of interest in each of the following areas:  (1) individual gate receipts 
(including other stadium revenues); (2) corporate proceeds; (3) broadcast revenues; (4) licens-
ing/merchandising fees; and (5) Internet/new media revenues.”). 
105.  Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). 
106.  Id. 
107.  Id. at 776 (“Unless we second-guess the judgment of Congress to limit § 1 to con-
certed conduct, we can only conclude that the coordinated behavior of a parent and its wholly 
owned subsidiary falls outside the reach of that provision.”).    
108.  Id. at 771 (holding that “the very notion of an ‘agreement’ in Sherman Act terms be-
tween a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary lacks meaning”). 
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parent and wholly owned subsidiary do ‘agree’ to a course of action, there 
is no sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served dif-
ferent interests, and there is no justification for § 1 scrutiny.”109   
In an effort to stay true to the original purpose behind the creation of 
the single entity doctrine, the Supreme Court must reject the NFL’s request 
for single entity status in American Needle.  As stated above,110 the major-
ity of federal circuit courts and commentators agree there is little doubt that 
sports leagues lack the “complete unity of interest” that is required under 
Copperweld.111  Treatment of sports leagues as a single entity would thus 
be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning for affording single en-
tity status.112  With sports leagues, there are different interests among its 
member teams, and there is justification for Section 1 scrutiny.113  As the 
majority of federal circuit courts and commentators have pointed out, these 
different interests can be seen in the fact that each NFL member team acts 
as an individual entity, wholly distinct from the NFL itself.114  As a result, 
each NFL team is forced to compete with one another to secure media cov-
erage, fan support, sponsorship deals, television revenues, and talented 
                                                           
109.  Id.  
110.  See supra Part IV.A. 
111.  See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 
(9th Cir. 1984) (stating that “[t]hese attributes operate to make each team an entity in large part 
distinct from the NFL.”); Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(stating that the NFL teams’ competition off of the field “itself tends to show that the teams pur-
sue diverse interests and thus are not a single enterprise under §1”); Edelman, supra note 24, at 
925 (“[T]here is little doubt that clubs in these leagues lack ‘complete unity of interest’ in each of 
the following areas:  (1) individual gate receipts (including other stadium revenues); (2) corporate 
proceeds; (3) broadcast revenues; (4) licensing/merchandising fees; and (5) Internet/new media 
revenues.”). 
112.  Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771. 
113.  See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390 (stating that “[t]hese attributes operate to 
make each team an entity in large part distinct from the NFL.”); Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099 (stating 
that the NFL teams’ competition off of the field “itself tends to show that the teams pursue di-
verse interests and thus are not a single enterprise under §1”); Edelman, supra note 24, at 925 
(“[T]here is little doubt that clubs in these leagues lack ‘complete unity of interest’ in each of the 
following areas:  (1) individual gate receipts (including other stadium revenues); (2) corporate 
proceeds; (3) broadcast revenues; (4) licensing/merchandising fees; and (5) Internet/new media 
revenues.”). 
114.  L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390 (stating that “[t]hese attributes operate to 
make each team an entity in large part distinct from the NFL.”); see also Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 
1099 (stating that the NFL teams’ competition off of the field “itself tends to show that the teams 
pursue diverse interests and thus are not a single enterprise under §1”); Edelman, supra note 24, 
at 925 (“[T]here is little doubt that clubs in these leagues lack ‘complete unity of interest’ in each 
of the following areas: (1) individual gate receipts (including other stadium revenues); (2) corpo-
rate proceeds; (3) broadcast revenues; (4) licensing/merchandising fees; and (5) Internet/new me-
dia revenues.”). 
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players and coaches.115  These different interests show a lack of “complete 
unity of interest” between the NFL and its member teams and provide justi-
fication for rejecting single entity treatment.  Therefore, if the Supreme 
Court is to stay true to the original meaning behind the single entity doc-
trine, it must reject single entity treatment for sports leagues.  
2.  The Seventh Circuit’s Holding in American Needle Was Limited to the 
Narrow Context of Promoting Intellectual Property 
The Supreme Court should reject the NFL’s request to extend the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding in American Needle to all facets of sports leagues 
because that holding was specifically limited to the particular facts of the 
case.116  Noting that it had never “render[ed] a definitive opinion as to 
whether the teams of a professional sports league can be considered a sin-
gle entity”117 under Copperweld, the Seventh Circuit specifically limited its 
review to “the actions of the NFL and its member teams as they pertain to 
the teams’ agreement to license their intellectual property collectively via 
NFL Properties.”118  For more than forty years, the NFL and its teams 
“have promoted NFL Football by collectively licensing and marketing their 
identifying trademarks for use on consumer products” such as hats and jer-
seys.119  These activities are carried out by NFL Properties, the teams’ 
jointly owned affiliate.120  In the narrow context of licensing its intellectual 
property, the court found it significant that the NFL “competes with other 
forms of entertainment for a[ ] [limited] audience” and emphasized that the 
loss of that audience to other “forms of entertainment necessarily impacts 
the individual teams’ success.”121  The court stated that “nothing in § 1 
prohibits the NFL teams from cooperating so the league can compete 
against other entertainment providers.”122  Because of these facts, the court 
held that the NFL acted as a single entity in the limited context of promot-
                                                           
115.  See L.A. Mem’l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390 (“In addition to being independent busi-
ness entities, the NFL clubs do compete with one another off the field as well as on to acquire 
players, coaches, and management personnel. . . . [T]here is also competition for fan support, lo-
cal television and local radio revenues, and media space.”).  
116.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 742 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“Thus, in reviewing the district court’s decision, we will limit our review to . . . the actions of the 
NFL and its member teams as they pertain to the teams’ agreement to license their intellectual 
property collectively via NFL Properties.”). 
117.  Id. at 741.  
118.  Id. at 742. 
119.  Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 1. 
120.  Id. 
121.  Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 743. 
122.  Id. at 744. 
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ing its intellectual property.123   
While the NFL may act as a single entity when licensing its intellec-
tual property, the Supreme Court must not forget that the NFL “teams may 
assume different roles in different circumstances—with different conse-
quences for antitrust enforcement.”124  Therefore, although the Supreme 
Court could affirm the Seventh Circuit holding and allow an exception for 
the NFL in instances when it is licensing its intellectual property, it must 
still hold that sports leagues remain subject to Section 1 liability because its 
member teams still compete with each other in areas such as ticket sales, 
player acquisition, corporate sponsorships, and television, radio and mer-
chandising revenues.125  Because the Seventh Circuit’s holding in American 
Needle was limited to the particular facts in that case,126 the Supreme Court 
should not extend its holding and afford single entity status to all facets of 
sports leagues. 
3.  Rejecting the Minority Approach on Policy Grounds 
The Supreme Court should also reject single entity status to sports 
leagues on policy grounds.  Since its enactment, the Sherman Act has been 
used as a tool to protect consumers and small businesses from anticompeti-
tive conduct.127  “The courts, Congress, and commentators . . . all [recog-
nize] the importance to consumer welfare of antitrust constraints—or the 
absence thereof—in the sports league context.”128  As the Second Circuit so 
                                                           
123.  Id. (holding that “the NFL teams are best described as a single source of economic 
power when promoting NFL football through licensing the teams’ intellectual property”). 
124.  Brief for the U.S., supra note 49, at 17 (citing Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 
284 F.3d 47, 56–57 (1st Cir. 2002)). 
125.  See Edelman, supra note 24, at 925 (“[T]here is little doubt that clubs in these 
leagues lack ‘complete unity of interest’ in each of the following areas: (1) individual gate re-
ceipts (including other stadium revenues); (2) corporate proceeds; (3) broadcast revenues; (4) li-
censing/merchandising fees; and (5) Internet/new media revenues.”). 
126.  Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 742 (“Thus, in reviewing the district court’s decision, we 
will limit our review to . . . the actions of the NFL and its member teams as they pertain to the 
teams’ agreement to license their intellectual property collectively via NFL Properties.”). 
127.  See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“[W]e cannot fail to 
recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally 
owned businesses.”); Posting of Caleb Groos to FindLaw, DOJ Antitrust Enforcement to Return; 
New Approach to Bundling and Predatory Pricing?,  
http://blogs.findlaw.com/free_enterprise/2009/05/doj-antitrust-enforcement-to-return-new-
approach-to-bundling-and-predatory-pricing.html (May 11, 2009, 12:34 EST) [hereinafter Find-
Law] (stating that the “ultimate goal of antitrust laws [is] the protection of consumer welfare”). 
128.  Supplemental Brief of Petitioner at 9, petition for cert. filed, Am. Needle, Inc. v. 
Nat’l Football League, (U.S. June 8, 2009) (No. 08-661), 2009 WL 1604441 [hereinafter Supple-
mental Brief]; see, e.g., Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1188 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(“[T]he welfare losses stemming from the potentially anticompetitive agreements among profes-
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aptly put it, to immunize the NFL from Section 1 scrutiny would be “[t]o 
tolerate such a loophole [that] would permit league members to escape anti-
trust responsibility for any restraint entered into by them that would benefit 
their league or enhance their ability to compete even though the benefit 
would be outweighed by its anticompetitive effects.”129   
The consequences of granting sports leagues Section 1 immunization 
are numerous.130  For example, with Section 1 immunization, the NFL and 
other sports leagues could:  (1) reduce the competition for free agents in 
sports leagues by restricting a player’s ability to move from one team to 
another; (2) enforce a salary schedule which could restrict competition by 
teams for prospective players, coaches, and management personnel; (3) fur-
ther restrict control over team marketing, merchandising and broadcasting 
rights; and (4) damage the negotiating ability of the player unions, likely 
resulting in more player strikes or lock outs.131  By ruling against the NFL, 
the Supreme Court will preserve the ability of small businesses to sue the 
league on antitrust grounds.132  This will prevent many small businesses 
from being completely shut out from doing business with the league.133  
With price competition from small businesses,134 the NFL will not be able 
to engage in exclusive commercial deals with the highest bidder,135 which 
likely would have run small businesses into the ground and driven up 
prices for fans.136 
By refusing to grant single entity status to sports leagues, the Supreme 
Court will preserve the ability of the federal circuit courts to regulate sports 
leagues under Section 1.137  This will ensure that consumers are protected 
from any anticompetitive conduct by sports leagues and their teams, consis-
tent with the goals of the Sherman Act.138  In sum, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                      
sional sports clubs have been well documented.”).  
129.  N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982). 
130.  See infra Part IV.C.3. 
131.  Munson, supra note 4; see also Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13. 
132.  See Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13. 
133.  See FindLaw, supra note 127 (“Enforcing our laws against anti-competitive behavior 
could mean more room for small businesses to compete. . . . [A]ntirust enforcement will shift 
business behavior in favor of competition open to more small businesses.”); see also Belson & 
Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13; Belson, supra note 17, at B11. 
134.  See The Huffington Post, supra note 7. 
135.  See Belson & Schwarz, supra note 3, at B13. 
136.  See id. 
137.  Edelman, supra note 24, at 926 (stating that “[b]y rejecting the notion that premier 
American sports leagues are ‘single entities,’ federal courts importantly retain the ability to regu-
late premier American sports clubs under Section One of the Sherman Act.”). 
138.  Edelman, supra note 24, at 926–27 (arguing that by rejecting single entity status for 
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should use the American Needle case to establish a rule that denies single 
entity status to sports leagues. 
V.  A PRO-BUSINESS COURT IN ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE UNDER CHIEF 
JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS 
 While it is usually not easy to predict how the Supreme Court will 
rule in a particular case, sometimes a review of the Supreme Court’s politi-
cal leanings and its recent decisions in a particular area of law can cast 
some insight on the possible outcome.  In reviewing the Supreme Court’s 
most recent decisions under the guidance of Chief Justice Roberts, it is ap-
parent that “since John Roberts was appointed chief justice in 2005, the 
[Supreme] [C]ourt has seemed only more receptive to business con-
cerns.”139  Under the Chief Justice’s leadership, forty percent of the cases 
his Supreme Court (Roberts Court) granted certiorari to involved business 
interests, up ten percent from the Rehnquist Court.140  The Roberts Court’s 
recent pro-business trend has prompted Jeffrey Rosen, a professor of law at 
George Washington University Law School, to jokingly refer to the Rob-
erts Court as “Supreme Court Inc.”141 
 Consistent with this general pro-business trend, the emerging anti-
trust jurisprudence from the Roberts Court can also be characterized as 
conservative, pro-business, and pro-defendant.142  This trend is evident by 
the fact that the Roberts Court heard more antitrust cases in its first two 
terms than it had in the five years prior under the Rehnquist Court.143  In 
                                                                                                                                      
professional sports leagues, “American consumers remain protected against the risks of anti-
competitive conduct within the professional sports industry.”); see also Supplemental Brief, supra 
note 128, at 9 (“The courts, Congress, and commentators . . . all recognize[ ] the importance to 
consumer welfare of antitrust constraints—or the absence thereof—in the sports league con-
text.”). 
139.  Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38, 40. 
140.  Id. at 38, 40 (stating that “[f]orty percent of the cases the court heard last term in-
volved business interests, up from around 30 percent in recent years.”). 
141.  Id. at 38-39.  See also Jeffrey Rosen, GW Law School Profile, 
http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/profile.aspx?id=1763 (“The Chicago Tribune named him one of 
the 10 best magazine journalists in America and the L.A. Times called him, ‘the nation's most 
widely read and influential legal commentator.’”). 
142.  Matthew Freimuth & Estee M. Konor, Sotomayor’s Approach To Antitrust, LAW360, 
July 9, 2009, 
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details%5CFileUpload265%5C2619%5CSotomayors_Appr
oach_To_AntitrustLaw360_7.09.pdf.  See generally Jeffrey Rosen, Santa Clara Law Review 
Symposium:  Big Business and the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 929, 929 (2009). 
143.  See Rosen, supra note 139, at 40 (stating that “[w]hile the Rehnquist Court heard less 
than one antitrust decision a year, on average, between 1988 and 2003, the Roberts Court has 
heard seven in its first two terms—and all of them were decided in favor of the corporate defen-
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each and every case, the Roberts Court ruled “in favor of the corporate de-
fendants,” a telling foreshadowing of things to come in American Nee-
dle.144 
A.  Major Victories for Big Business Under the Roberts Court in the 
Twombly and Iqbal Antitrust Decisions 
The Roberts Court has gone to great lengths to protect big business in 
antitrust lawsuits.145  In response to the growing number of antitrust cases 
against big businesses in recent years, the Roberts Court in Bell Atl. Corp. 
v. Twombly had an opportunity to consider the appropriate pleading stan-
dard for a Sherman Act Section 1 claim.146  Since the 1957 Conley v. Gib-
son147 case, Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been 
interpreted as “requir[ing] only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant 
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”148  
Before Twombly, Rule 8(a)(2) was considered to merely require liberal no-
tice pleading, which could be seen as an effort by the courts to keep the 
merits of the claim as the central focus of the litigation.149  The idea behind 
this relaxed pleading standard was to ensure that each litigant had his day 
in court.150  However, in a drastic shift from how Rule 8(a)(2) had been in-
terpreted for fifty years after Conley, the Roberts Court, in an effort to 
shield big businesses from expensive antitrust suits, used Twombly to re-
interpret Rule 8(a)(2) as requiring a heightened fact pleading standard.151  
The Roberts Court reasoned that:  
[S]tating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual 
matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made. 
Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not im-
pose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply 
calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that dis-
                                                                                                                                      
dants.”). 
144.  Id. (stating that in regards to antirust cases, “the Roberts Court has heard seven in its 
first two terms—and all of them were decided in favor of the corporate defendants.”). 
145.  See infra Part V.A–B. 
146.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–55 (2007).  
147.  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
148.  Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 
149.  Id. at 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 
506, 514 (2002)). 
150.  Id. 
151.  Id. at 556. 
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covery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.152 
In support of its new interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2), the Roberts Court 
focused on the costs of antitrust litigation to defendants.153  The Roberts 
Court noted that “[t]he costs of modern federal antitrust litigation and the 
increasing caseload of the federal courts counsel against sending the parties 
into discovery when there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs can 
construct a claim from the events related in the complaint.”154  By recogniz-
ing that “some threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the outset before 
a [recognizable] antitrust case should be permitted to go into its inevitably 
costly and protracted discovery phase,”155 the Roberts Court took a major 
step towards protecting big businesses from antitrust suits in the federal 
courts.  
Following the Twombly decision, there was confusion in the lower 
federal courts as to whether the heightened pleading standard set forth in 
the case applied only to antitrust cases or to all federal cases.156  In 2009, 
the Roberts Court used Ashcroft v. Iqbal to resolve this issue.157  Instead of 
limiting the scope of Twombly to the narrow context of antitrust cases, the 
Roberts Court instead decided to take the Twombly holding one step fur-
ther.158  In Iqbal, the Roberts Court stated that the Twombly heightened 
pleading standard applies for “all civil actions.”159  While Iqbal was not a 
business case, it can be seen as another major victory for big business un-
                                                           
152.  Id.  
153.  See id. at 558 (“Thus, it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust 
complaint in advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discov-
ery can be expensive.”) (citation omitted). 
154.  Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 558 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 
1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
155.  Id. (quoting Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner, J. sitting by designation)). 
156.  See Yuri Mikulka, Ashcroft v. Iqbal:  Raising the Federal Pleading Standard for 
Plaintiffs and Providing a New Defense Tool for Corporate Defendants, LAWUPDATES.COM, 
Aug. 18, 2009, 
http://www.lawupdates.com/tips/entry/iashcroft_v._iqbal_i_raising_the_federal_pleading_standar
d_for_plaintiffs_a. 
157.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (“Respondent first says that our deci-
sion in Twombly should be limited to pleadings made in the context of an antitrust dispute. This 
argument is not supported by Twombly and is incompatible with the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the de-
cision was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8. That Rule in turn governs the 
pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.’ Our 
decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to anti-
trust and discrimination suits alike.”) (internal citations omitted).  
158.  See Mikulka, supra note 156; Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. 
159.  Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. 
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der the Roberts Court.160  Democrat lawmaker Henry Johnson of Georgia 
called the “decision an unexpected gift for the business community.”161  
The Roberts Court’s holding in Iqbal makes it much more difficult for 
plaintiffs to survive motions to dismiss by defendants—usually big busi-
nesses—in all federal complaints, not just antitrust suits.162 
B.  Other Recent Antitrust Cases Under the Roberts Court 
Twombly and Iqbal are not the only decisions by the Roberts Court 
that limit antitrust enforcement and/or liability against defendants.163  In 
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, the Roberts Court limited antitrust 
law when securities regulations apply by holding that securities law pre-
cludes antitrust claims.164  The Roberts Court eliminated the price-squeeze 
claim as an antitrust cause of action in Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline 
Commc’ns, Inc., by overturning a sixty-year-old precedent written by Judge 
Learned Hand.165  In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lum-
ber Co., the Roberts Court overturned a plaintiff’s Sherman Act Section 2 
monopolization claim.166  The Roberts Court overruled a sixty-year-old in-
terpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act in Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. 
                                                           
160.  See Kristina Peterson, US Dem Reps Craft Bill to Prevent Easily Dismissing Law-
suits, NASDAQ.COM, Oct. 27, 2009, http://nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-news-
story.aspx?storyid=200910271746dowjonesdjonline000543&title=us-dem-reps-craft-bill-to-
prevent-easily-dismissing-lawsuits. 
161.  Id. 
162.  Mikulka, supra note 156 (“[F]or plaintiffs lacking requisite facts to support a claim 
at the outset, it will mean fewer opportunities for relief. This is good news for defendants looking 
for some reprieve from the onslaught of civil litigation filed against corporations . . . .”). 
163.  See infra Part V.B. 
164.  Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 283–85 (2007) (“We believe 
it fair to conclude that, where conduct at the core of the marketing of new securities is at issue; 
where securities regulators proceed with great care to distinguish the encouraged and permissible 
from the forbidden; where the threat of antitrust lawsuits, through error and disincentive, could 
seriously alter underwriter conduct in undesirable ways, to allow an antitrust lawsuit would 
threaten serious harm to the efficient functioning of the securities markets. . . . We therefore con-
clude that the securities laws are ‘clearly incompatible’ with the application of the antitrust laws 
in this context.”). 
165.  Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120 n.3, 1123 
(2009) (“Given developments in economic theory and antitrust jurisprudence since Alcoa, we find 
our recent decisions in Trinko and Brooke Group more pertinent to the question before us. . . . 
[W]e hold that the price-squeeze claims set forth in that complaint are not cognizable under the 
Sherman Act.”). 
166.  Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 326 
(2007) (“[The plaintiff] has not satisfied the Brooke Group standard. Therefore, its predatory-
bidding theory of liability cannot support the jury’s verdict. For these reasons, we vacate the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.”). 
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Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., when it overturned a plaintiff’s price discrimina-
tion claim.167  In Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, the Roberts Court held that no per 
se liability exists for joint ventures that set prices.168  The Roberts Court 
again overruled a sixty-year-old precedent in Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. 
Ink, Inc., by holding that a “patent does not necessarily confer market 
power upon the patentee.”169  In Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc., the Roberts Court disregarded almost one hundred years of le-
gal precedent, by holding that minimum resale price maintenance by busi-
nesses is no longer unlawful per se.170   
An examination of the recent antitrust decisions by the Roberts Court 
leads one to infer a pro-business, pro-defendant agenda.171  Not a single 
case taken by the Roberts Court has expanded antitrust enforcement or li-
ability.172  Rather, all of the cases mentioned above limited the scope of an-
titrust liability.  Some did so by overturning long-standing precedents fa-
voring plaintiffs, while others reversed jury verdicts or court of appeal 
                                                           
167.  Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 182, 185 
(2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Today, however, by adopting a novel, transaction-specific con-
cept of competition, the Court eliminates that statutory protection in all but those rare situations in 
which a prospective purchaser is negotiating with two Volvo dealers at the same time. . . . For 
decades, juries have routinely inferred the requisite injury to competition under the Robinson-
Patman Act from the fact that a manufacturer sells goods to one retailer at a higher price than to 
its competitors. This rule dates back to the following discussion of competitive injury in Justice 
Black's opinion for the Court in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).”). 
168.  Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2006) (“We see no reason to treat Equilon 
differently just because it chose to sell gasoline under two distinct brands at a single price. As a 
single entity, a joint venture, like any other firm, must have the discretion to determine the prices 
of the products that it sells, including the discretion to sell a product under two different brands at 
a single, unified price. If Equilon's price unification policy is anticompetitive, then respondents 
should have challenged it pursuant to the rule of reason. But it would be inconsistent with this 
Court's antitrust precedents to condemn the internal pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture 
as per se unlawful.”). 
169.  Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 38–39, 45–46 (2006) (“The pre-
sumption that a patent confers market power migrated from patent law to antitrust law in Int’l Salt 
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). . . . Congress, the antitrust enforcement agencies, and 
most economists have all reached the conclusion that a patent does not necessarily confer market 
power upon the patentee. Today, we reach the same conclusion, and therefore hold that, in all 
cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market power 
in the tying product.”). 
170.  Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881–82 (2007) 
(“In Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), the Court established 
the rule that it is per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, for a manufacturer to 
agree with its distributor to set the minimum price the distributor can charge for the manufac-
turer's goods. . . . We now hold that Dr. Miles should be overruled and that vertical price re-
straints are to be judged by the rule of reason.”). 
171.  See supra Part V.A–B. 
172.  See supra Part V.A–B. 
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decisions favoring plaintiffs.173  The current trend of the Roberts Court an-
titrust jurisprudence certainly favors the NFL in American Needle. 
C.  The Politics of Antitrust Law and the Roberts Court 
1. The Politics of Antitrust Law 
The Roberts Court’s recent pro-business trend in its antitrust jurispru-
dence should not come as a surprise.  For the past twenty-five years, anti-
trust enforcement has been linked to the political leaning of the oval of-
fice.174  This political link is in accord with what Congress intended when 
the Sherman Act was passed.175 Robert Pitofsky, a Georgetown Law pro-
fessor and former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission,176 has noted 
that “an antitrust policy that failed to take political concerns into account 
would be unresponsive to the will of Congress and out of touch with the 
rough political consensus that has supported antitrust enforcement for al-
most a century.”177  With Democrat presidents, there has been an expansion 
of antitrust law and a shift towards strong antitrust enforcement by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) and the United States Department of Justice 
(DOJ) against big businesses.178  With Republican presidents, there has 
been a contraction of antitrust law and a reduction in antitrust enforcement 
                                                           
173.  See supra Part V.A–B. 
174.  See infra Part V.C.1.  See generally Posting of Ashby Jones to Wall St. J. L. Blog, 
The Antitrust Revolution is Underway, But How Far Can It Go?, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/02/01/the-antitrust-revolution-is-underway-but-how-far-can-it-
go/tab/article (Feb. 1, 2010, 9:39 EST) [hereinafter Antitrust Revolution] (stating that “antitrust 
followers predicted that enforcement activities would start slowly ramping up” soon after Presi-
dent Barack Obama took office following the lax enforcement of the antitrust laws against an-
ticompetitive corporate behavior during the eight years George W. Bush was president).  
175.  See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 
1052 (1979). 
176.  Robert Pitofsky, Georgetown Law Full Time Faculty Biography, 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/facinfo/tab_faculty.cfm?Status=FullTime&ID=307 
(“Professor Pitofsky has had a distinguished career in government and is especially known for his 
work in the antitrust field. He has served as a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission . . . 
[and] is co-author of the text, Cases & Materials on Antitrust.”). 
177.  Pitofsky, supra note 175, at 1052.  
178.  See infra Part V.C.1.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 
MICH. L. REV. 213, 250 (1985) (“Historically, liberals have been fairly successful in getting Con-
gress to write liability-expanding antitrust statutes.”); Michael Catanzaro, The Antitrust Club:  A 
Weapon in Bill Clinton’s Hands, NAT’L REV., Sept. 25, 2000, at 24, 26 (stating that there is a 
“hostility to successful businesses that animates the Clinton antitrust apparatus”); Antitrust Revo-
lution, supra note 174 (stating that “President Obama began installing the top antitrust enforcers 
in the land in the early months of 2009 . . . [a]fter eight years of lax enforcement” under President 
George W. Bush).  
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by the FTC and DOJ against big businesses.179   
For example, in the late 1980s under Republican President Ronald 
Reagan, the antitrust division of the FTC had mounted “about as minimal 
an antitrust program as can be imagined.”180  Under President Reagan and 
fellow Republican President George H. W. Bush, the antitrust division of 
the DOJ filed only three cases regarding the conduct of monopolies.181  In 
contrast, President William J. Clinton, the Democrat successor to George 
H. W. Bush, took an extremely different approach to antitrust enforce-
ment.182  President Clinton’s antitrust regime was “hyperactive, politicized 
and regulatory.”183  From 1994 to 1999, President Clinton’s “antitrust divi-
sion filed a total of 481 cases, vastly increased its investigations of sup-
posed monopolies, and intensified reviews of mergers and acquisitions.”184  
President George W. Bush, the Republican successor to President Clinton, 
subsequently contracted the expansive antitrust enforcement approach of 
the Clinton administration and reverted to the minimal enforcement of anti-
trust that was seen under Republican Presidents Reagan and George H. W. 
Bush.185  Under President George W. Bush, the DOJ did not pursue a single 
anti-monopoly case and his administration installed high hurdles for en-
forcement against anticompetitive conduct.186   However, in May 2009, un-
der the guidance of President George W. Bush’s Democrat successor Presi-
dent Barack Obama, the DOJ announced that it would return to the “more 
strict enforcement of federal antitrust laws” seen in the Clinton administra-
tion.187  True to its word, in January 2010, the DOJ announced that the 
Obama administration had directed it to “review the legality of the contro-
versial Bowl Championship Series” and determine if it “potentially runs 
afoul of the nation’s antitrust laws.”188 
                                                           
179.  See infra Part V.C.1. See Hovenkamp, supra note 178, at 250 (“Leaders in conserva-
tive administrations have asked for legislation weakening the [antitrust] laws . . . .”).  See also 
Antitrust Revolution, supra note 174 (stating that there was lax enforcement of the antitrust laws 
against anticompetitive corporate behavior during the eight years George W. Bush was president). 
180.  Catanzaro, supra note 178, at 24, 26 (quoting Robert Pitofsky).  
181.  Id. at 26. 
182.  See id.  
183.  Id. at 28. 
184.  Id. at 26. 
185.  See FindLaw, supra note 127. 
186.  Id. 
187.  Id. 
188.  Justice Dept.:  Obama Administration May Take Action on BCS, 
SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM, Jan. 29, 2010, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/football/ncaa/01/29/obama.bcs.ap/index.html. 
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2.  The Politics of the Roberts Court Justices 
 When one considers the fact that the current Roberts Court is com-
posed of more conservative, pro-business justices such as Roberts, Alito, 
Thomas, Kennedy, and Scalia, it should come as no surprise that the Rob-
erts Court held for the corporate defendants in each of its recent antitrust 
decisions.189  Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
recently wrote an article discussing the connection between the political 
ideologies of the Supreme Court justices and their voting records.190  The 
article, Rational Judicial Behavior:  A Statistical Study, used “a database 
that include[d] the political background and voting records of the past 70 
years of Supreme Court justices—who appointed each justice and how the 
justices decided every case—to come up with a ranking, from most conser-
vative to least conservative, of the 43 justices who have served on the court 
since 1937.”191  Unsurprisingly, the study revealed that over the past 70 
years, Republican-appointed justices had a tendency to vote conservatively, 
while Democrat-appointed justices had a tendency to vote liberally.192  Re-
publican presidents appointed seven of the nine Supreme Court justices that 
were on the Roberts Court during its recent pro-business antitrust jurispru-
dence.193  According to Judge Posner’s study, Justices Thomas, Scalia, 
Roberts, and Alito are “[f]our of the five most conservative justices to serve 
on the Supreme Court” since 1937.194  The study also ranked Republican 
appointee and current justice on the Roberts Court, Anthony Kennedy, as 
the tenth most conservative Supreme Court justice since 1937.195  Former 
President George W. Bush’s appointments of the Chief Justice and Justice 
Alito to the Supreme Court may turn out to be his most long lasting legacy, 
as they have shifted the Supreme Court in a more conservative direction.196  
This shift favors the NFL in American Needle. 
                                                           
189.  Rosen, supra note 139, at 40 (stating that in regards to antitrust cases, “the Roberts 
Court has heard seven in its first two terms—and all of them were decided in favor of the corpo-
rate defendants.”); see also Munson, supra note 4. 
190.  See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior:  A Statis-
tical Study, 1 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 775 (2009).  
191.  Justin Ewers, Ranking the Politics of Supreme Court Justices:  Four of the Five Most 
Conservative Justices Since 1937 are on the Bench Today, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 12, 
2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/05/12/ranking-the-politics-of-
supreme-court-justices.html; Landes & Posner, supra note 190. 
192.  Ewers, supra note 191.  
193.  Id. 
194.  Id.; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 190. 
195.  See Landes & Posner, supra note 190. 
196.  Nina Totenberg, A Changed Court Faces Key Decisions In New Term, NPR.COM, 
Oct. 5, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113438661. 
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D.  The NFL:  Asking for Single Entity Treatment in the Right Place at the 
Right Time 
For decades, the NFL has unsuccessfully sought antitrust immunity 
under Copperweld in the federal circuit courts.197  As explained above,198 
the majority of federal circuit courts have rejected the NFL’s previous at-
tempts for single entity treatment under Section 1199 because its individual 
member “teams compete with each other for free-agent players, for 
coaches, for executives, for sponsors, for naming rights money and for 
fans.”200  However, with the Roberts Court obvious pro-business trend in 
its most recent antitrust jurisprudence, the NFL might finally be presenting 
its argument for single entity treatment under Copperweld “in the right 
place at the right time.”201   
The NFL is “one of America’s most profitable collection of busi-
nesses,” with combined team revenues in 2008 of over $6.5 billion.202  The 
NFL’s individual member team revenues in 2007 ranged from $195 million 
to over $300 million per year.203  Many of the NFL franchises are “now 
valued at over $700 million per year.”204  With this in mind, the NFL is 
hoping that the conservative, pro-business and pro-defendant trend of the 
Roberts Court’s most recent antitrust jurisprudence continues in American 
Needle.  
1.  The NFL’s Use of the Twombly Holding in American Needle 
In Twombly, the Roberts Court focused its analysis on “[t]he costs of 
modern federal antitrust litigation and the increasing caseload of the federal 
courts.”205  In an effort to appeal to the Roberts Court’s position against 
costly antitrust litigation that it announced in Twombly, the sports leagues 
                                                           
197.  Munson, supra note 4. 
198.  See supra Part V.A–C. 
199.  See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 327 (stating that “[t]he courts have 
mainly rejected” single entity status for professional sports leagues); Ross & Szymanski, supra 
note 24, at 238 (“[C]ourts have overwhelmingly rejected efforts by club-run leagues to be treated 
as single entities.”); Edelman, supra note 24, at 893 n.11 (“Many courts have rejected the single-
entity defense in the scope of premier American sports leagues.”). 
200.  Munson, supra note 4. 
201.  Id. 
202.  Edelman, supra note 24, at 891. 
203.  See Special Report:  NFL Team Valuations, FORBES.COM, Sept. 10, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/30/sportsmoney_nfl08_NFL-Team-Valuations_Revenue.html.  
204.  See Edelman, supra note 24, at 891. 
205.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.1984). 
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argue that the answer to the question of whether they function “as a single 
entity for purposes of Section 1 is a threshold issue that can bring otherwise 
costly and burdensome antitrust litigation to an early end.”206  The NFL ar-
gues that the “application of Copperweld to professional sports leagues is a 
frequently recurring issue”207 that “result[s] in years of litigation and enor-
mous burden and expense.”208  The sports leagues maintain that the incon-
sistent application of Copperweld caused by the current federal circuit 
court split “forces the league[s] to operate under a cloud of uncertainty as 
to whether its most basic collective actions will, depending on [which cir-
cuit is] chosen by an antitrust plaintiff, subject it to a ruling that its member 
teams have ‘conspired’ in violation of Section 1.”209  
 For the NFL and other sports leagues, this “uncertainty chills col-
laboration and decision-making, and it inevitably decreases interbrand 
competition.”210  The chilling effect on collaboration and decision-making 
caused by the current federal circuit court split is especially costly to sports 
leagues because it is the very [type of] “conduct [that] the antitrust laws are 
designed to protect.”211  The leagues contend that a uniform standard “find-
ing that a professional sports league is a single entity whose collective ac-
tivities fall outside the scope of Section 1”212 would allow “for potential 
early resolution of [Section 1] antitrust challenges [which] furthers judicial 
economy and avoids unnecessary discovery, motions practice, trial, and 
other litigation burdens.”213  The NFL’s argument is consistent with the 
                                                           
206.  Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 6–7.  
207.  Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 10–11 (“The experience of the NFL is not un-
usual among professional sports leagues; nor has the cascade of antitrust suits against them 
abated. Major League Baseball, the National Hockey League, NASCAR, and the ATP Tour each 
is currently defending, or has recently defended, Section 1 antitrust suits challenging its decisions 
about how to produce its integrated entertainment product.”). 
208.  Id. at 13. 
209.  Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 6. 
210.  Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 9;  see also Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 6 
(“Mindful of that ever-present threat, the league is therefore unfairly limited and constrained in its 
ability to develop business strategies that might enable it to compete more effectively in the larger 
entertainment marketplace.”). 
211.  Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 9 (arguing that under Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., “mistaken standards that permit inference of conspiracy when none should 
be found ‘are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed 
to protect.’”  475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)). 
212.  Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 8. 
213.  Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 13.  See Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 7 
(stating that “[t]he trial court’s management of this case was consistent with the goals announced 
by this Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, where it emphasized that deficiencies in a case 
‘should . . . be exposed at the . . . minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the 
court.’”  550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007)) (citation omitted) (alteration in original)). 
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goals announced in Twombly and is sure to appeal to the Roberts Court in 
American Needle.214 
2.  The NFL’s Twombly Argument Is Inconsistent with the Approach Used 
By the Seventh Circuit 
While the NFL’s appeal to the Roberts Court for a uniform standard 
based on preventing costly antitrust litigation may be consistent with the 
goals announced in Twombly,215 it is inconsistent with the analysis used by 
the Seventh Circuit that led it to grant the NFL single-entity status in the 
first place.216  The Seventh Circuit held in American Needle that “whether a 
professional sports league is a single entity should be addressed not only 
‘one league at a time,’ but also ‘one facet of a league at a time.’”217  It was 
specifically because of this more searching inquiry into a specific “facet of 
a league” that the Seventh Circuit held that in the specific facet of “promot-
ing NFL football through licensing the teams’ intellectual property,” “the 
NFL teams are best described as a single” entity.218  Therefore, rather than 
offering the potential for early resolution of antitrust challenges that the 
NFL seeks in its appeal to the Roberts Court,219 the Seventh Circuit’s ap-
proach to single entity analysis actually “appears to require more factual 
                                                           
214.  Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 13 (arguing that a uniform standard would allow 
“for potential early resolution of [Section 1] antitrust challenges [which] furthers judicial econ-
omy and avoids unnecessary discovery, motions practice, trial, and other litigation burdens.”); see 
Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 7 (stating that “[t]he trial court’s management of this case 
was consistent with the goals announced by this Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, where it 
emphasized that deficiencies in a case ‘should . . . be exposed at the . . . minimum expenditure of 
time and money by the parties and the court.’”  550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007)) (citation omitted) (al-
teration in original)). 
215.  Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 13 (arguing that a uniform standard would allow 
“for potential early resolution of [Section 1] antitrust challenges [which] furthers judicial econ-
omy and avoids unnecessary discovery, motions practice, trial, and other litigation burdens.”); see 
Brief for the NBA, supra note 25, at 7 (stating that “[t]he trial court’s management of this case 
was consistent with the goals announced by this Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, where it 
emphasized that deficiencies in a case ‘should . . . be exposed at the . . . minimum expenditure of 
time and money by the parties and the court.’”  550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007)) (citation omitted) (al-
teration in original)). 
216.  See infra Part V.D.2. 
217.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 742 (7th Cir. 2008) (quot-
ing Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd.  v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996)).  
218.  Id. at 744. 
219.  Brief for the NFL, supra note 25, at 5–6 (“This case presents an appropriate opportu-
nity to resolve this recurring circuit dispute, to provide further guidance on the principles recently 
articulated by this court in Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006), and to permit resolution, 
early in the litigation, of Section 1 antitrust challenges to the decisionmaking of highly integrated 
joint ventures.”). 
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analysis than that normally needed under the Supreme Court’s single entity 
analysis in Copperweld.”220   
Under the traditional Copperweld analysis, the NFL could simply “of-
fer evidence of [its] corporate structure and that, by itself, is sufficient to 
permit the court to find” for or against affording single entity status.221  
This simple corporate structure analysis reduces litigation costs by 
“limit[ing] the range of discovery relevant to a motion for summary judg-
ment based on Copperweld.”222  In contrast to the simple corporate struc-
ture arguments that are sufficient in the traditional Copperweld analysis, 
“[u]nder the Seventh Circuit’s ‘fact intensive’ look at ‘one facet of a league 
at a time,’ the courts will need to look at more than just corporate structure, 
with the Seventh Circuit [asking for] . . . an inquiry . . . into the market and 
competition questions that courts typically bypass” under the traditional 
Copperweld analysis.223  The inquiry into the market and competition that 
the Seventh Circuit approach demands is more costly than the traditional 
approach because “more discovery would be relevant and expected.”224  
Therefore, while the Seventh Circuit approach may be costlier to the NFL, 
it is the only approach that has led to single entity treatment for the NFL.  
Thus, by asking the Roberts Court to make a ruling in American Needle 
based on limiting antitrust costs, the NFL is asking the Court to invalidate 
the only approach that has ever afforded the league single entity status.  
VI.  THE EFFECT THAT A DEMOCRAT PRESIDENT AND HIS SUPREME 
COURT APPOINTEE WILL HAVE ON THE ROBERTS COURT’S ANTITRUST 
JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN NEEDLE 
 American Needle will be the first antitrust case heard during Rob-
erts’ tenure as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court with a Democratic presi-
dent in the White House.225  Unlike his predecessor, President Obama has 
already announced his willingness to resume the vigorous approach to anti-
trust enforcement that was seen under the Clinton Administration.226  While 
it seems apparent that the Roberts Court does not share President Obama’s 
position on antirust enforcement,227 in August 2009, President Obama took 
                                                           
220.  McKeown, supra note 26, at 367 (emphasis added). 
221.  Id. at 371 n.45. 
222.  Id. 
223.  Id. at 371. 
224.  Id. at 371 n.45. 
225.  See supra Part V. 
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227.  See supra Part V.A–C. 
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the first step in potentially halting the Roberts Court’s recent pro-business, 
pro-defendant antitrust jurisprudence by appointing Sonia Sotomayor, a 
liberal justice, to replace Justice David Souter on the Supreme Court.228   
A.  Justice Sotomayor’s Impact on the Roberts Court’s Future Antitrust 
Jurisprudence 
 While Justice Sotomayor’s appointment will not alter the Roberts 
Court’s ideological makeup, she is replacing a liberal justice that tended to 
vote with the conservative majority on antitrust issues.229  Although Justice 
Souter has often been considered a reliable liberal vote, his antitrust juris-
prudence has been conservative under the tenure of Chief Justice Rob-
erts.230  Justice Souter wrote the Twombly decision and voted with the con-
servative majority in Credit Suisse Securities, Weyerhaeuser, Volvo Trucks, 
Dagher, and Illinois Tool Works231—all cases that limited the scope of anti-
trust liability by either overturning long-standing precedents favoring plain-
tiffs, or by reversing jury verdicts or court of appeal decisions favoring 
plaintiffs.232   
 Also of particular note is the fact that Justice Thomas dissented in 
Credit Suisse233 and Volvo Trucks,234 showing that he will not always vote 
with the conservative majority of the Roberts Court on antitrust issues.  
Therefore, while at first glance it may seem that Justice Sotomayor’s re-
placement of a liberal justice will do little to alter the Roberts Court’s re-
cent antitrust jurisprudence, Justice Souter’s and Justice Thomas’s antitrust 
voting records under the guidance of Chief Justice Roberts make it clear 
that Justice Sotomayor’s vote may have a much greater impact in close an-
titrust decisions than originally anticipated. 
B.  Justice Sotomayor Is Likely to Adopt the Majority Approach in 
                                                           
228.  The Justices of the Supreme Court, 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). 
229.  Freimuth & Konor, supra note 142 (stating that Sotomayor’s “appointment will not 
alter the court’s ideological makeup.”). 
230.  David G. Savage, A Man of Tradition, and Suprises, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 2009, at 
A12 (stating that Justice Souter is a “liberal on the court today.”). 
231.  See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Credit Suisse Sec. 
(USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood 
Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 
U.S. 164 (2006); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, 
Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
232.  See supra Part V.A–B. 
233.  See, e.g., Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 287 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
234.  See, e.g., Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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American Needle Based on Her Second Circuit Antitrust Jurisprudence 
 While it remains to be seen what effect Justice Sotomayor will have 
on the current pro-business trend of the Roberts Court’s antitrust jurispru-
dence in American Needle,235 a review of her decisions on the Second Cir-
cuit shows a familiarity with antitrust law,236 and suggests that she may be 
a justice that is willing to disagree with the current antitrust jurisprudence 
of the Roberts Court.237  To the extent that the Roberts Court displays a 
pro-business agenda in its antitrust jurisprudence, Justice “Sotomayor’s 
prior [antitrust] decisions show no indication that she will necessarily fit 
that mold.”238  Justice Sotomayor’s past antitrust decisions reveal a “highly 
fact-specific approach to antitrust matters and an awareness of the legisla-
tive intent and policies underlying the federal antitrust laws.”239  Justice So-
tomayor’s Second Circuit antitrust jurisprudence suggests that she favors 
the party whose position is consistent with the legislative intent underlying 
the antitrust statutes.240  
 While the impact of Justice Sotomayor’s vote in American Needle is 
uncertain,241 her Second Circuit antitrust jurisprudence reveals that she will 
likely follow the reasoning used by the majority of federal circuit courts 
and reject the NFL’s claim for single entity treatment in American Nee-
dle.242  As stated above,243 the majority of federal circuit courts and com-
mentators agree that there is little doubt that sports leagues lack the com-
                                                           
235.  Freimuth & Konor, supra note 142 (stating that American Needle “will be the new 
Justice Sotomayor’s first opportunity to weigh in on an antitrust matter from the Supreme Court 
and will provide antitrust practitioners with a more concrete sense of whether she will bring about 
any significant impact on the Roberts court’s emerging antitrust jurisprudence.”). 
236.  Id. (stating that Justice Sotomayor’s Second Circuit antitrust “decisions demonstrate 
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policies underlying the federal antitrust laws.”).   
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238.  Id. 
239.  Id.; see Innomed Labs, LLC v. ALZA Corp., 368 F.3d 148, 159-61 (2d Cir. 2004) 
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242.  See infra Part VI.B. 
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plete unity of interest required under Copperweld.244  Treatment of sports 
leagues as a single entity in American Needle would then be inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s reasoning for affording single entity status.  
Since the reasoning of the majority approach is consistent with the original 
meaning behind the single entity doctrine established in Copperweld, Jus-
tice Sotomayor is likely to find that the different interests among the mem-
ber teams provide justification for Section 1 scrutiny of sports leagues.  
Therefore, consistent with her adherence to legislative intent in antitrust 
cases while on the Second Circuit, Justice Sotomayor will likely reject the 
NFL’s request for single entity status in American Needle. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Note has examined the current split that exists in the federal cir-
cuit courts of appeal on the issue of whether a sports league should be con-
sidered a single entity for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The 
approach taken by the majority of federal circuit courts is preferable be-
cause sports leagues fail to meet the Copperweld requirement of complete 
“unity of interest” that is necessary for single entity treatment.245  The Rob-
erts Court should adopt the majority approach because the approach recog-
nizes the diverse interests of individual teams,246 “the importance to con-
sumer welfare of antitrust constraints” on sports leagues,247 and is 
consistent with the original meaning behind the single entity doctrine.248   
While it seems logical that the Roberts Court would adopt the ap-
proach favored by most commentators and the majority of federal circuit 
courts, a review of the Roberts Court’s most recent antitrust jurisprudence 
makes that outcome unlikely.249  Not a single case taken by the Roberts 
Court has expanded antitrust enforcement or liability.250  Rather, all of the 
cases have limited the scope of antitrust liability by either overturning long-
                                                           
244.  See also Edelman, supra note 24, at 925 (“[T]here is little doubt that clubs in these 
leagues lack ‘complete unity of interest’ in each of the following areas:  (1) individual gate re-
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to argue that not every team has a complete unity of interest with every other team.”). 
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standing precedents favoring plaintiffs or by reversing jury verdicts or 
court of appeal decisions favoring plaintiffs.251  Therefore, despite the fact 
that logic would point to the majority approach being adopted, the current 
pro-business, pro-defendant trend of the Roberts Court’s most recent anti-
trust jurisprudence is likely to continue in American Needle, with a ruling 
in favor of the NFL. 
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** The United States Supreme Court decided American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League 
on May 24, 2010, holding that the National Football League is not a single entity for purposes of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The Court agreed with the author and the majority of federal cir-
cuit courts that sports leagues fail to meet the Copperweld requirement of complete “unity of in-
terest” that is necessary for single entity treatment.  The Court’s holding is a clear departure from 
the pro-business, pro-defendant trend of its most recent antitrust jurisprudence.  However, 
whether American Needle signifies the end to the Roberts Court’s pro-business antitrust jurispru-
dence, or is simply an aberration, is yet to be seen. 
